Deductibles are commonly used to tame increasing health care costs. Numerous studies find that higher deductibles reduce health care utilization. In this paper we compare utilization in Switzerland between two health care plans with deductibles of 1,500 CHF and 2,500 CHF (1CHF ∼ =1$) per calendar year. While there is a minimum deductible level in Switzerland, individuals are free to increase their deductible and thereby reduce their insurance premium. In order to distinguish between selection and moral hazard we use regional variation in premiums as an instrument. Moreover, we take advantage of a policy change in 2005 that introduced the higher deductible for the first time. The results show that selection leads to considerable differences in utilization between the two groups, while we find no behavioral differences across both groups. If anything health care expenditures are higher for male individuals with the higher deductible, while for females there are no differences between the two deductible levels.
Introduction
Starting with the RAND experiment researchers show consistently that price differences in health care affect utilization (Manning et al., 1987; Aron-Dine et al., 2013) . However, in terms of deductibles it is less clear what happens at higher ranges. This paper tries to fill this gap by comparing utilization between two high deductible health care plans (1,500 vs 2,500 CHF per year) in Switzerland.
Individuals in Switzerland can freely choose their deductible on a predefined scale, with the lowest deductible amounting to 300 CHF and the highest deductible to 2,500 CHF. While deductibles in general are studied intensively, this is the first paper to compare the deductibles of 1,500 CHF and 2,500 CHF in terms of health care expenditures. This is promising for several reasons.
Firstly, a large share of the population concentrates on the upper end of the deductibles and this share is increasing over time. In the US an estimated 17.4 million Americans were enrolled in a high deductible health care plan (American's Health Insurance Plans, 2014). The Kaiser Family Foundation (2015) find for the US that the share of employees with a deductible over 1,000 $ increased from 10% in 2006 to 46% in 2015. The Affordable Health Care Act is likely to increase these rates even further. Within Switzerland, 35.3% of the population choose a deductible of 1,500 and 2,500 CHF in 2013 (Federal Office of Public Health FOPH, 2013, pg. 182) . While comparing lower and higher deductibles is surely interesting, it has already been analyzed in numerous studies which mostly find that the higher deductible leads to lower health care expenditures, even after controlling for selection.
Comparing the highest deductible levels allows a comparison between individuals with lower expected health care costs. This group is interesting because it is less experienced in obtaining health care, but also in general healthier than individuals who choose other deductible options. Therefore the effect of different deductibles for this group is less clear.
Secondly, there are several reasons to believe that after a certain point increasing the deductible further will not affect health care costs. When comparing two high deductible insurance plans out-of-pocket-prices are identical over large intervals of health utilization. 1 Moreover, when looking at total yearly expenditures a large share of individuals (40-50%) have no health care expenditures throughout the whole year. 2 Thirdly, too high deductible levels might incentivice underconsumption and health neglect. This might be a particular issue, since recent literature shows that individuals prone to underconsumption are likely to self select into a high deductible health insurance . Especially men seem vulnerable to such underconsumption. Kozhimannil et al. (2013) compare the effect of high deductibles between men and women. Their findings suggest that men substantially reduce emergency department visits at all severity levels, while females only reduced low severity emergency visits. Thus they conclude that the higher deductibles incentivice men to forgo needed care. In order to analyze this underconsumption and the effects more in detail there is a need to look at high deductible cases and compare health care utilization between males and females.
A further reason is that the empirical findings in the literature regarding moral hazard of high deductibles in the US are mixed. The main explanation for these different findings is that most US studies look at consumer directed health plans (CDHP) where high deductibles are combined with personal medical accounts, partly financed by employer contributions. Within this setting it is difficult to isolate the effect of different deductibles from different employer contributions. Since our study focuses on Switzerland where personal medical accounts do not exist, we are able to look at a ceteris paribus effect of a higher deductible on health care expenditures.
Moreover, in Switzerland the 2005 reform introduced the high deductible (2,500 CHF) for the first time, while before the maximum deductible was 1,500 CHF. This policy led to a significant increase in the deductible level for some individuals who increase their deductible in 2005, while the majority of the individuals who start with the deductible of 1,500 CHF in 2004 do not change their deductible. The 2 Not all of these individuals have zero costs. In particular, insurees might buy (non-expensive) medicines for treating frequent diseases such as the flu, which might not have been recorded by the health insurance. Moreover, individuals who have total expenditures lower than the deductible have no incentive to submit their bills, since they will not be refunded. However, a high share of the billings is transmitted from the provider of health services to the insurance company electronically. Moreover, CSS (the largest health care insurance provider in Switzerland and our data provider) conducted an internal study where they interact the billing mode with the deductible level. They do not find a higher probability of positive healthcare costs for this interaction term, which suggests that individuals submit their bills independent on the deductible level. Last but not least individuals with the lower deductible should be more likely to send in their bills, since the likelihood that their health care expenditures exceeds the deductible is higher. However, our results below show that individuals with higher deductibles do not have lower health care costs on average controlling for selection. Hence underreporting of individuals with the higher deductible cannot explain this finding.
policy change thus provides additional exogenous variation that we can use in order to identify causal effects of different variables. Furthermore, the question about the maximum deductible is interesting from a policy perspective. This paper will help to shed light on this discussion.
Looking at descriptive statistics of individuals in our sample with a deductible of 1,500 or 2,500 CHF, the policy seems to have been rather ineffective. The mechanic effect of a slower increase in premiums is obvious in the data: premiums on average increased by roughly 30 CHF from 2004 to 2005 (from 2,089 to 2,118 CHF), while from 2003 to 2004 premiums had increased by 200 CHF. However, in terms of health expenditures the policy seems to have failed in taming increasing health care costs which increased by 165 CHF on average (from an annual average of 735 CHF in 2004 to 903 CHF in 2005 . This increase is even higher than the 110 CHF increase observed from 2003 to 2004. Of course this is only a descriptive analysis of average individual costs. This study will provide an in depth analysis and identify causal effects of a higher deductible on individual health care expenditures.
Since individuals choose their deductible themselves, we need to take care of selection in order to identify causal effects of a higher deductible in terms of moral hazard. To model selection into the high deductible, we use the policy reform in combination with a instrumental variable approach. The instrument is based on the regional variation in the difference in premiums between the 1,500 CHF and the 2,500 CHF deductibles. This difference depends upon place of residence (43 regions), the current health care plan (2 plans), additional casualty insurance and age group (18-25 vs. 26 or older) . We instrument this choice by the difference in premiums between these two deductible levels. This difference in premiums amounts between 0 and 800 CHF a year or 0-30% of the yearly premium with a deductible of 1,500 CHF (see Figure 2 ). 3
In terms of methods we employ both a standard linear IV strategy and a generalized linear model with a log link (as first suggested by Silva and Tenreyro, 2006) in order to better deal with both the large amount of zeros in the dependent variable and very high health care expenditures for some individuals.
The results show no reduced utilization for individuals with the 2,500 CHF de-3 An additional choice not considered here is the choice of the insurance provider. In this study we have data from the largest health insurance provider in Switzerland, who insures about 15% of the population. Since we do not have data from other providers we cannot model the switching between insurances. In order to analyze whether our results are sensible to this assumption below we will provide results for all individuals in the sample, and for individuals who stay with CSS and thus remain in our sample in the years 2003-2007. ductible (as compared to the 1,500 CHF deductible) after controlling for selection through an instrumental variables strategy. This is remarkable given that the difference in the deductible amounts to 1,000 CHF. For men and for individuals who stay in our sample over the whole period from 2003 to 2007 our results even suggests that health care costs are slightly higher for individuals with the higher deductible. This result is consistent with health neglect by males associated with underinvestments in health leading to high health care expenditures. For individuals prone to such underinvestment, the high deductible of 2,500 CHF might well be another factor delaying necessary doctor visits resulting in even higher health care costs for this group.
The remaining of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of the literature. In Section 3 we discuss the Swiss health insurance system and the institutional background. Section 4 prepares for the empirical analysis: we explain the construction of the dataset, present descriptive statistics and describe our identification strategy. Section 5 presents the results and Section 6 concludes.
Related literature
The effect of different deductibles on health care expenditures has been analyzed extensively in the literature. Brook et al. (1984) in their famous RAND experiment were among the first to analyze this relationship. Between 1974 and 1982 the experiment enrolled 7,706 persons aged between 14 and 61 and assigned them to 14 different health care plans with different copayments and deductibles. Newhouse et al. (1981) find that individuals with full coverage spend about 60% more on health as compared to individuals with a copayment rate of 95%. However, their focus is more on different copayment rates rather than on different deductibles. In particular the deductible levels vary between 150 and 1,000 $. For higher deductible levels they run a simulation analysis and conclude that deductibles above 1,500 $ (in 1991 $) have little effect on demand (Joseph P. Newhouse and the RAND Corporation Insurance Experiment Group, 1993, p. 193 ).
Once we move away from field experiments selection becomes an issue. In particular there are two challenging aspects of selection. First it is important to correct for the selection of individuals who choose their plan based on their (expected) health situation. Second, there is a selection of firms who choose the healthcare plans which they provide for their employees. The second selection problem does not apply in Switzerland since insurance is mandatory for everybody and insurance companies directly provide the different health plans with the different deductible levels to their costumers. In what follows, we will first look at how researchers in the US tackle the different selection problems and then look at the Swiss environment.
In the US the economic literature mainly focuses on consumer directed health plans (CDHP). These are the most dominant high deductible health care plans.
They include a high deductible coupled with additional personal medical accounts, partly financed by employer contributions, which can be used to finance uncovered health expenditures. Bundorf (2012) provide an extensive literature review on the effectiveness of CDHP in comparison to traditional health care plans and conclude that the effects vary between 5 and 14%. In terms of selection they point out that most studies rely on propensity score matching in order to control for selection on unobservables. In this review we will only present recent economic studies that focus on a causal estimation and deal with similar deductibles as the ones we analyze in Switzerland.
In a very recent study Haviland et al. (2016) compare 54 large employers in a differences-in-differences analysis. Since the employer chooses whether to adopt the health care plan or not the issue of individual selection is mitigated; moreover, they employ a machine learning technique in order to balance the sample of firms between plans. At the firm level they find that compared to traditional health care plans the introduction of CDHP, with deductible levels around 1,500 $, reduces yearly health expenditures by 5% in each of the three years subsequent to the CDHP choice.
Looking at how many individuals in each firm choose a certain plan, this translates into a yearly reduction of 15%.
Lo Sasso et al. (2010) look at several hundred smaller firms. Since their data comes from a health insurance company that is only selling CDHPs, they make a within comparison between different CDHP, rather than comparing CDHPs to traditional plans. In terms of deductibles, their study looks at a wide range of deductibles, with an average deductible of about 2,000 $. Because there are no competing plan options at the firm level, individual selection is less of an issue. In terms of selection at the firm level they include firm fixed effects, but time varying firm selection might still be an issue. Their results suggest that even in this range a higher deductible decreases spending considerably. In particular an increase in the deductible by 1 $ is found to decrease spending by 0.5 $. Borah et al. (2011) analyze CDHPs by comparing two medium sized employers, where one firm switches to a CDHP leading to an increase in the deductible from 500 $ to 2,000 $. However, this sharp increase in the deductible is combined with the introduction of employer contributions of 1,000 $ and thus the effective increase in the deductible was only about 500 $. Overall their results suggest no impact on health care costs. Analyzing different cost subgroups they find a positive impact of higher deductibles on outpatient visits, especially for individuals in the upper percentiles.
Looking at Switzerland, firm selection is not an issue, due to mandatory health care and no involvement of the employer in terms of providing health care insurance. In terms of individual selection most studies rely on instrumental variables in order to create quasi natural experiments. Gerfin and Schellhorn (2006) use the premium level as an instrument to model the selection into the higher deductibles.
They find that higher deductibles (1,200 and 1,500 CHF combined) lead to a lower probability of going to the doctor. A closely linked study uses the supplementary hospital insurance as identifying instrument (Schellhorn, 2001) . The results suggests that most of the observed reduction in the number of physician visits is the result of self-selection of individuals into the respective insurance contracts, and not due to induced changes in healthcare utilization. Trottmann et al. (2012) model the selection into the higher deductibles with different instruments such as the premium level, applied premium reductions, number of years of CSS membership and a dummy indicating bad credit record. As previous studies they combine the deductibles 1,000, 1,500 and 2,500 CHF to one high deductible. In relation to the base category of 300 CHF they find reduced expenditures even after controlling for the endogeneity of the deductible by combining an instrumental variables strategy with a health proxy generated by health care expenditures in previous years.
Our analysis is in line with these studies but there are two major differences.
First we concentrate on two high deductible levels of 1,500 and 2,500 CHF which has not be done so far. Nearly all studies focus on high deductibles and compare it with lower deductibles. These studies thus do not generalize to higher levels, where individuals are usually healthier and an increase in the deductible might have very different effects. Second we implement a novel instrument, namely the difference in premiums between the newly introduced deductible of 2,500 CHF and the already existing deductible of 1,500 CHF.
Swiss health system and the 2005 reform

Health insurance in Switzerland
Since January 1 1996, health insurance is compulsory for all individuals living in Switzerland. Moreover, in 1996 the Swiss federal law on health insurance 4 introduced the (yearly) deductible levels. In the year 2004 these amounted to 300, 400, 600, 1,200 and 1,500 CHF. These costs have to be paid out of pocket by the insured in case of health care utilization. After this limit is reached a copayment rate of 10% is in place, independent of the deductible level (or health care plan) up to a maximal copayment. 5 After this, all further costs are covered by the insurance. The deductible for the next year can be changed every year before the end of December. A higher deductible leads to a lower premium. In 2005 premiums varied considerably, amounting between 1,000 and 7,000 CHF a year, with the residence region and the deductible having the largest impact on the premium.
Thus individuals need to tradeoff higher costs up front vs lower ex post payments for health care utilization. This tradeoff is depicted in Figure 1 . Figure 1 shows the payments for an adult in two different regions in Switzerland for two different deductibles. If health expenditures equal zero, only the premium is paid. In this case it is cheaper to have the higher deductible, resulting in a lower premium. However, once the health care expenditures exceed a certain level, the individual is better off by choosing the lower deductible and paying the higher premium. In the graph this occurs for health care expenditures of 1,900 CHF in Glarus (grey) and for 2,300 CHF in Neuenburg (black). 4 Bundesgesetz über die Krankenversicherung (KVG) 5 The maximum copayment was last changed in 2004 and currently amounts to 700 CHF a year.
6 The latter two are small health insurances that have their database administrated by CSS and thus they are included in our sample The graphs shows the payment schedule for four different insurance types, for an adult (older than 25) in two different regions in Switzerland for two different deductibles. If the individual has no health care expenditures, only the premium is due, which is represented by the intercept. Then depending on the deductible the first 1,500 CHF or 2,500 CHF are paid directly by the individual. For health care expenditures exceeding this deductible the health insurance provider pays 90% of the bill, creating the first kink in the graph. Finally, all costs within a calendar year exceeding the deductible plus 7,000 CHF are entirely paid by the health insurance provider. This creates the second kink at 8,500 CHF and 9,500 CHF respectively.
Insurers can decide which plans to offer, 7 but have to accept all applications. In terms of coverage, the packages offered by the different health insurance providers are very similar, because basic health provision is regulated at federal level and ensures that most health expenses are covered. Finally, risk transfers between health insurances are in place.
Individuals who have low income and low wealth are subject to a reduced premium, i.e. part of their health insurance premium is paid directly or indirectly by the regional authority. The eligibility criteria for this reduction vary by region of residence and year. Moreover, the size of this reduction depends largely on the individual income situation. Thus this reduction has no effect on the income of health insurance companies, but only affects the premium paid at the individual level.
To further control the health care expenditures starting from 1994 a supply side cost sharing is in place. The insurances provide a system of doctors namely a health maintenance organization (HMO) and insurees are obliged to first visit a specific HMO practice. Moreover, due to the lower cost of this insurance plan a premium reductions of up to 20% is granted.
Accident insurance is complementary to health insurance and compulsory as well. It covers all health care costs that result from accidents 8 . All employed workers are automatically insured through their employer if they are employed by the same employer for at least 8 hours per week. Self-employed, unemployed and non-working individuals are insured through their health insurance. In this case the health insurance premium increases by about 10%.
The 2005 reform
In 2005 the deductibles were adjusted from 300, 400, 600, 1,200 and 1,500 CHF to 300, 500, 1,000, 1,500, 2,000 and 2,500 CHF to further increase the cost awareness of individuals. The insurance companies were obliged to inform the insured persons by the end of September 2004. In case of no response individuals were automatically reclassified to the closest deductible. In case of a similar difference between the lower and the upper deductible to the original deductible the higher deductible was automatically selected.
Furthermore, the premium reductions of the different deductibles were newly regulated in 2005. In the year 2004 there was a clearly defined maximum premium reduction for every deductible in relation to the base category with a deductible of 300 and the respective age group, accident insurance and premium region. In the year 2005 the individual maximum premium reductions were abolished. As a first rule the state introduced a general maximum premium reduction of 50% to the baseline deductible of 300 CHF for all deductible levels. The second rule was that the premium reductions could not exceed 80% of the inherited risk.
Arguments against the reform were brought forward mainly by the left wing parties in Switzerland. The main critique was that the premium reductions are too high compared to the potential reduction of the moral hazard effect. Furthermore, there was the argument that the offered premium reductions undermines the solidarity in the system, since the redistribution from healthy to unhealthy was reduced. 
The identification strategy
The aim of this study is to causally estimate the effect of a higher deducible on health care costs. However, since healthy individuals self-select into higher deductibles and thus the deductible choice is endogenous a simple comparison will give biased results.
To correct for endogeneity of the deductible choice we use an instrumental variable approach. In particular, we employ the difference in premiums between the two and amounts between 0 and 800 CHF a year or 0-30% of the yearly premium with a deductible of 1,500 CHF. Figure 2 shows the density of the difference in premiums between the two deductibles both in absolute and relative terms. In absolute terms the difference amounts to around 400 CHF on average. In terms of percentagewith an average premium for the 1,500 CHF deductible amounting to 2,000 CHFthis roughly translates into a 20% difference. ∆ premiums in CHF ∆ premiums in percent
The graphs show the density of the difference between the two premiums for the deductible of 1500 CHF and the deductible of 2500 CHF. The first graph measures the difference in Swiss Francs and the second graph shows the density of the difference as a percentage of the premium for the 1500 deductible.
This instrument seems arguably exogenous, even though there are some possibilities of how the exclusion restriction could be violated. Firstly, it could be that CSS sets their prices of the deductible of 2,500 CHF based on the health care costs in the different regions. To mitigate this potential bias we control for the average and total costs in different cells determined by the health insurance provider, the different regions, the current health care plan (2 plans), accident insurance and the age group. The results are hardly affected by whether we include these costs or not, and thus it is unlikely that the exclusion is violated through this channel.
A second possible violation of the exclusion restriction could be that higher available income, resulting from the premium reduction, increases health spending.
However, the income effect is negligible since a large share of individuals with a low income receive a premium subsidy (see also Trottmann et al., 2012) . Furthermore, Schellhorn (2001) ical ceteris paribus) difference in premiums between the two deductible levels was already depicted in Figure 2 . The table shows that this difference is slightly larger for the individuals who choose the higher deductible. This will be analyzed more in detail in the first stage of our regressions below. Moreover, in terms of insurance related variables, most individuals choose the standard package (instead of HMO).
Explanatory variables
Finally, about 30% have additional accident insurance. As outlined in section 3 this means that these individuals have no employer who covers their accident insurance and thus are either self-employed or non-working. 
Outcome variables
In Table 3 the outcome variables are shown, together with their mean, standard deviation (sd), and the percentiles of the outcome distribution (q50, q75, q90, q95, q99). These variables are provided for the treatment group with a deductible of 2,500 CHF and the control group with a deductible of 1,500 CHF for the years before (2004) and after the policy shock (2005). In terms of distribution the large number of zeros is noteworthy. These are expected, given that the analysis is restricted to individuals with a high deductible.
For inpatient, medicine and other expenses more than 50% of the individuals show no costs. Inpatient expenditures have an even more skewed distribution with 90-95% showing no expenditures.
Finally, Table 3 shows that already before treatment the two groups are very different. 
Estimation
Our analysis focuses on the health utilization effects of choosing a higher deductible. 
Finally, since the decision to choose a higher deductible is a binary choice we will employ two different strategies. First, we will estimate a linear model. In the second approach we will employ a three stage approach: first we estimate a probit model (zero stage), and then use the predicted values of this model as an instrument (first stage) as suggested by Wooldridge (2002, p. 623) in order to improve efficiency.
The second stage equation estimates the effect of the deductible on health care utilization:
where Y i,r,2005 stands for the different outcome variables discussed in Section 4.4 and i,r,2005 refers to the error term.
We will estimate two different models. First we will estimate a standard linear model and employ a 2SLS estimation as described above. Then in a second step we will estimate a generalized linear model with a log link (as first suggested by Silva and Tenreyro, 2006) in order to better deal with both the large amount of zeros in the dependent variable and very high health care expenditures for some individuals. Silva and Tenreyro (2006) show that this estimator produces consistent estimates in the presence of zeros. Estimation of this generalized linear model will be implemented with a generalized methods of moments approach (GMM). In particular the population moment condition, given the model above reads:
where the exponential function enables the estimator to deal with zeros and very high health care costs. Standard errors in all regressions are clustered on the cell of the different health insurance providers, premium regions, age group, accident insurance and model. In column 3 we estimate the first stage with the predicted value based on the probit regression in column 2 as the instrument (see Wooldridge, 2002, p. 623 for details). Moreover, the F-statistics is much larger than 10 in all cases, used as the common rule of thumb for testing the relevance of instruments. In Panel D we present the results for inpatient costs. Here we once more find marginally significant (10% level) and positive effects for the generalized linear IV.
Results
Regression analysis: Short term effects
In columns seven and eight the effect seems to be slightly negative, but the standard errors are 3 times as large as the point estimates and thus we are unable to identify any effect in these two columns. Again the placebos are small and insignificant.
In the last Panel we look at medical expenditures. Once more the more efficient non-linear model suggests a marginally significant and positive effect, while all other point estimates are positive, but insignificant. (2) show regressions without IV, (3) and (4) show a normal IV, (5) and (6) show an IV where the instrument results form a probit regression and columns (7) and (8) present the results of a fixed effects estimation (first stages directly above the regression results in Panel A). Other control variables included in both stages are gender and language dummies, dummy variables for premium reduction, age controls (linear and squared term), total and average regional health care costs (all variables as measured in 2005). Standard errors in all regressions are clustered on the cell of the health insurance provider, different premium regions, age group, accident insurance and model, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Gender specific effects
Many previous studies have shown that health behavior differs considerably by gender (see for instance Kozhimannil et al., 2013) . Thus, we present gender specific results in Table 5 . Panels A and C, show the first stage. While men seem to be slightly more responsive to premium differences, there is no significant difference between the two.
In terms of outcomes in the second stage we only present the results for overall effects. In the first two columns, we see that once more individuals choosing the higher deductible have lower health care expenditures, for both women and men. However, once we take care of endogeneity of switching behavior by using IV, the results differ between the two groups: For women we find mostly negative and non significant coefficients, while for men we find positive and significant effects, indicating that individuals with the higher deductible have higher health care expenditures.
Robustness checks
One factor that could drive the results above are fatalities. In health economics it is commonly observed that individuals have very high health care expenditures during the last months and years of their life (see for instance Werblow et al., 2007) .
Thus we drop all individuals who are not present over the whole five year observation period, with deaths and change of health insurance provider being the most common causes. After this operation the sample drops from 96,158 observations to 80,295. Table 6 shows that the results are mostly unaffected by this change. Now the estimated effects are even more positive and significant, especially for inpatient and medicine expenditures. (2) show regressions without IV, (3) and (4) show a normal IV, (5) and (6) show an IV where the instrument results form a probit regression and columns (7) and (8) present the results of a fixed effects estimation (first stages directly above the regression results in Panel A). Other control variables included in both stages are gender and language dummies, dummy variables for premium reduction, age controls (linear and squared term), total and average regional health care costs (all variables as measured in 2005). Standard errors in all regressions are clustered on the cell of the health insurance provider, different premium regions, age group, accident insurance and model, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. (1) and (2) show regressions without IV, (3) and (4) show a normal IV, (5) and (6) show an IV where the instrument results form a probit regression and columns (7) and (8) present the results of a fixed effects estimation (first stages directly above the regression results in Panel A). Other control variables included in both stages are gender and language dummies, dummy variables for premium reduction, age controls (linear and squared term), total and average regional health care costs (all variables as measured in 2005). Standard errors in all regressions are clustered on the cell of the health insurance provider, different premium regions, age group, accident insurance and model, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Regression analysis: Medium term effects
Finally, Table 7 show an IV where the instrument results form a probit regression. Other control variables included in both stages are gender and language dummies, dummy variables for premium reduction, age controls (linear and squared term), total and average regional health care costs. Standard errors in all regressions are clustered on the cell of the health insurance provider, different premium regions, age group, accident insurance and model, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Conclusion
The analysis of the high deductibles is promising for several reasons. First a large share of individuals is concentrated in the highest deductible and this share is likely to increase due to policies such as the Affordable Health Care Act. Second, simulations based on the RAND experiment suggest that after a certain level a further increase of the deductible has limited effects on the health care expenditures (Joseph P. Newhouse and the RAND Corporation Insurance Experiment Group, 1993, p. 193) . Third, there is a debate about the abolition of the highest deductible or a redefinition of the deductibles in general in Switzerland. Critics of deductibles make the argument that healthy people profit too much from lower premiums if they choose the highest deductible. Furthermore, it is argued that high deductibles lead to a weakening of the solidarity in the social health insurance, since the monetary redistribution from healthy to unhealthy is reduced by lower premiums for the highest deductible levels.
However, the empirical identification is challenging, especially without a randomized experiment at hand. This challenge is created by the advantageous selection of healthier individuals into higher deductibles and the selection of firms adopting high deductible health care plans. Another hurdle is created by the skewed distribution of health care expenditures. In order to address the latter we employ a generalized linear model with a log link (as first suggested by Silva and Tenreyro, 2006 ). Furthermore, this study focuses on Switzerland in order to avoid firm selection. Finally, we employ an instrumental variable together with a policy change in order to disentangle advantageous selection at the individual level from moral hazard.
Our results show that the difference in health expenditures between the highest deductible levels is mainly driven by advantageous selection. Once we isolate moral hazard using an instrumental variable approach the two groups look rather similar.
If anything health care expenditures are higher for individuals with the higher deductible. After differing by gender, we find significant increases in health care costs for males with higher deductibles, while for women higher deductibles seem to decrease expenditures. A possible explanation for this finding is health neglect and high health care expenditures, due to underinvestments in health and delays of doctor visits incentivized by a high deductible. This is in line with many other studies that observe that men are far less likely to go to the doctor than women (see for instance Winkelmann, 2004) . While part of this can be explained by differing needs, there is also evidence for behavioral differences (Springer and Mouzon, 2011; Addis and Mahalik, 2003) . This is also supported by Kozhimannil et al. (2013) who find that men with higher deductibles reduce emergency department visits at all severity levels and thus forgo needed care.
This result is robust to several robustness checks. First, we suspect that death occurrences might at least partly drive the results. Therefore we exclude all individuals who leave our sample over the 5 year observation period from 2003 to 2007 -mostly due to change of health insurer or death. However, after this exercise results become even stronger. In a second step we look at later years where the cost difference between the two groups weakens. This reduction in later years can be explained by health investments reducing costs in later years and a learning effect of individuals who underinvest in their health.
In terms of limitations it should be mentioned that due to our instrumental variable strategy we are estimating a local average treatment effect. More specifically we estimate the treatment effect on the population of compliers and thus the external validity of the results reported here remains unclear.
Summing up, our results reveal that after a certain level the spending elasticity to a higher deductible is close to zero. In terms of policy, deductibles in general are useful to increase cost awareness of the insured, however, after a certain level this result seems to wash out, or might even create incentives to avoid doctor visits and thereby lead to higher health care expenditures.
